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1. Introduction 
This article explores the extent to which regulatory impact assessments, or “impact 
assessments” (IAs),  have contributed to evidence-based policy-making and democratic 
governance in the European Union (EU). After the de-regulatory period of the 1980s and 
1990s, the last decade has seen a marked increase in interest on how to produce “better 
regulation” at national and international levels. The number of countries that assess the 
costs and benefits of new regulations almost doubled from 1998 to 2008 in the OECD 
area (OECD 2009), and the literature on IAs has also grown significantly in this period 
(Fritzsch et al. 2012; Radaelli and Meuwese 2010). 
Against this backdrop, this paper has two aims, related to policy analysis and to policy 
sociology respectively. First, to explore the policy model behind the Commission’s IAs, 
and the tensions and assumptions it generates for the production of IAs. Second, to 
explore the substantive content, an aspect that has been so far been largely missing in 
the IA debate. While the model employed by the Commission is important to understand 
what the IAs reviewed are set out to do, their content is important in order to understand 
how the Commission is doing it. The final contribution is methodological: the paper 
makes a case for moving away from the dominance of scorecards as the primary way to 
assess the quality of IAs. The analysis is based on a detailed study of six IAs in the 
areas of education, culture, youth and citizenship in the period 2002-2007. 
The paper proceeds in five stages. Section two introduces the better regulation agenda 
and IAs in the EU. This is followed by a review of the literature on public policy decision-
making models and a description of the methodology adopted in the study in sections 
three and four. Section five presents findings, which are discussed in section six. 
2. Better regulation and Impact assessments in the EU 
2.1 Better regulation 
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The drive to implement “better regulation” and IAs can be seen as a part of a wider move 
towards the ‘evaluative State’, which aims to bring greater rationalisation to policy. In the 
EU, the “better regulation” agenda was established in 2002, following the publication of 
the EU’s White Paper on European Governance (European Commission 2001). The EU 
defines its better regulation strategy as a range of initiatives to improve the regulatory 
environment by better evaluating the likely economic, social and environmental impacts 
of laws and regulations. The European Commission (henceforth the ‘Commission’) 
argues that there is “abundant evidence that better regulation can boost productivity and 
employment significantly, thus contributing to Europe’s growth and jobs agenda” 
(European Commission 2011:1).  
The move towards better regulation is also portrayed as having profound implications in 
the way policy-making comes about. According to the Commission: 
“Stakeholder consultations and impact assessments are now essential parts of the policy 
making process. They have increased transparency and accountability, and promoted 
evidence-based policy making”.  European Commission (2010:2). 
The Commission’s better regulation agenda is based on concrete action lines, which 
have translated into the simplification of regulations, the reduction of administrative 
burdens and, above all, the use of IAs to examine the impacts of future policy to aid 
decision-making. Major EU legislative, budgetary and policy-defining initiatives must 
undergo an IA before they are adopted (ECA 2010). This paper concentrates on IAs for 
expenditure programmes in education, culture, youth and citizenship, areas subject to 
the so-called “co-decision procedure” and the principle of parity (article 294 of the Treaty 
of the Functioning of the European Union). Within the Commission, each directorate 
general (DG) is responsible for preparing its IAs. In 2003, the Commission, European 
Parliament and Council committed to an inter-institutional agreement on better regulation 
which stipulates that since the European Parliament and the Council can, and often do, 
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propose substantial amendments to Commission’s proposals, such amendments can be 
subject to IAs too. This underlines the importance placed on IAs. Throughout I refer 
interchangeably to the EU and Commission IA model, as an inter-institutional common 
approach to IAs adopted in 2005 established that the European institutions will follow a 
common approach in the preparation of IAs. 
According to the European Commission the ‘better regulation’ strategy has shifted 
political attention from evaluation to IAs (Johnson 2007), as politicians are more 
interested in getting information for their own future regulations than in obtaining 
information on the achievements or failures of programmes adopted by their 
predecessors. IAs have also received much attention in the political science literature 
(Hertin et al. 2007; Radaeli 2007a; Radaelli and Meuwese 2010), and to a lesser extent 
sectoral policy literature (Adelle et al. 2006; Blacklund 2009). Yet so far, the burgeoning 
literature on the development of evidence-based education policy has paid surprisingly 
little attention to IAs (OECD 2007; Levin 2004). EU-related educational research has, 
similarly, so far concentrated its attention on other aspects, such as the ways in which 
the EU has created its own “polity” in education and culture (Grek and Ozga 2010; 
Souto-Otero 2011; Souto-Otero et al. 2008) and on the history and performance of its 
programmes (Ertl and Yu 2009), paying little attention to the analytical process 
supporting the decisions to establish education programmes. This paper aims to fill this 
gap in the education literature, while extracting more general implications for the analysis 
of IAs. 
2.2 Impact assessments and their role in the EU policy-making process 
The Commission (2009:5) defines Impact assessments (IA) as “a set of logical steps to 
be followed when you prepare policy proposals. It is a process that prepares evidence 
for political decision-makers on the advantages and disadvantages of possible policy 
options by assessing their potential impacts”. The purpose of IAs is to support, not to 
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substitute, policy decisions (European Commission 2002e; 2009). Besides a process, 
IAs can be a document. IAs as documents are the main focus of this article. The logic of 
IAs is threefold (Radaelli and De Francesco 2010). First is the logic of evidence-based 
policy-making. Following Majone (1989:48) the production of evidence is understood as 
the process through which a selection is made from the available stock of information 
and introduced at a specific point in an argument, to persuade the mind that a given 
factual proposition is true or false. ‘Evidence’ therefore is not dependent only on the 
content of the information, although this is an important aspect, but also on its 
deployment into an argument, its fit with it and with an audience. 
While the relationship between IAs and evidence-based policy-making is complex 
(‘evidence-based policy-making’ can be conceived as the presentation to policy-makers 
of data on ‘what works’, while IAs suggest how pre-determined courses of action are 
likely to have an impact) in practice both are closely linked. Thus, the Commission 
(2010) argues that IAs have promoted evidence-based policy-making as they support 
policy-making with empirical information, gathered through techniques such as logical 
framework analysis and cost-benefit analysis (European Commission 2002a). Most of 
the IAs analysed for this article include a section on lessons learnt from previous 
programmes in the areas covered: they aim to provide evidence on what worked in order 
to assess the likely impacts of predetermined courses of action. The evaluation of the 
Commission’s Impact Assessment system reinforces this idea, suggesting that IA 
proposals are to be based on evidence on what works, and on what needs should be 
addressed (Evaluation Partnership 2007). While individual IAs may or may not be 
‘evidence-based’ as an instrument they aim to bridge the gap between research and 
policy-making, ‘forcing’ public administration officials to gather evidence for policy-
making (Radaelli 2007a:931). Thus ‘the primary attraction of IA is that it makes 
government and regulatory agencies more evidence-based and more accountable’ 
(Radaelli and Meuwese 2010:140). 
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The second logic refers to democratic governance. This acknowledges that IAs are not 
simply internal procedures to improve policy-decisions. During the IA process civil 
society and other stakeholders are consulted, so that diffuse interests can influence 
policy. The IA process is not exclusively guided by economic considerations, which are 
the main focus in EU ex-ante evaluations. “Impact assessments are policy-driven” 
(European Commission 2002d:3), thus potential benefits that cannot be quantified still 
play an important role, and extensive consultation with stakeholders according to a set of 
standards is required, potentially reducing the legitimacy concerns associated with much  
‘evidence-based’ policy making (cf. Biesta 2007). IAs can be used to provide 
opportunities for a plurality of actors to interact in the policy-making process, become 
policy co-producers, make this process more diffuse and accountable (cf. Eriksson 
2012). In this respect, the logic of IAs can be related to Habermasian (1996) discourses 
on procedural rationality, and his notion of idealised governance structures as well as to 
notions of civic republican governance. In practice, such models face challenges related 
to their idealised vision of politics and the public arena, also palpable in the IA process. 
Political deals are not made in the public in the process of IA construction (Radaelli and 
De Francesco 2010), public consultations and the search for agreement can take more 
time than the policy-process allows (Kagan 2001). Moreover, issues of conflict and 
power are largely removed from the analysis in favour of consensus and rationally 
motivated/ presented agreements (Flyvbjerg 1998). 
A third logic is the logic of delegation, whereby the political decision-makers aim to keep 
control of the bureaucracies to which they have delegated competencies. The 
Commission stresses the importance of the first two logics mentioned above, which are 
thus those examined in this paper. 
Before proceeding further it should be noted that the IAs reviewed were produced at a 
particular (early) point in time after the adoption of IAs by the Commission and that 
several changes have occurred since, such as the creation of the formally independent 
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Commissions IA board, established in 2006 to issue opinions on the quality of Impact 
Assessments conducted by the DGs with the aim of ensuring their quality. The IA Board, 
today composed by nine Director-level officers from different DGs in their personal 
capacity who report to the president of the Commission directly, might request 
improvements to the proposed IAs. Discussions are underway regarding the ways in 
which EU institutions (in particular the Parliament) should relate to IAs, which may have 
an impact on the political economy of EU decision-making and the IA process in 
particular. 
3. Better regulation, impact assessments and decision-making models 
What is the policy model behind the Commission’s IAs? The question is important 
because it enables us to explore the limitations, assumptions and strengths of the 
processes through which new EU programmes and policies are designed. This section 
reviews briefly five alternative models: rational, incremental, administrative, mixed-
scanning and garbage can. The rational, or synoptic, model of decision-making (Arrow 
1951) is based on six steps for decision-making: 1- problems are identified, 2- goals are 
established, 3- all the possible alternatives are generated, 4- the likely consequences of 
each alternative are examined, 5- the best alternative is selected, 6- the decision is 
implemented and evaluated. The model assumes clear goals, complete information and 
cognitive capacity to analyse the problem. It assumes that values and facts, and means 
and ends can be clearly separated. There is also often an assumption that values can be 
specified and ranked to evaluate alternatives.  
According to the ‘incremental model’ (Lindblom 1959), designed as a reaction to the 
rational model, decision-makers focus on those policies that differ incrementally from 
existing policies, rather than attempting to have a comprehensive evaluation of all 
possible alternatives. Only a small set of alternatives and outcomes are considered, and 
for these only a small number of “important” consequences are evaluated. According to 
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the model small policy changes are often superior to radical ones almost in a pro-inertial 
way. There are continuous ends-means and means-ends adjustments, which make 
problems manageable. The model rejects the possibility of adopting “the right decision”. 
Instead, there is a “never-ending series of attacks” on the issues that policies try to 
address. 
In the ‘administrative model’ (Simon 1947; 1993), the quest for the rational “the best” is 
abandoned in favour of a “satisfying strategy”: the selection of a satisfactory solution. 
The model acknowledges that decision-makers are faced with limited information, 
cognitive limitations and a finite amount of time to take decisions. A “bounded rationality” 
operates. Instead of synoptically assigning numerical indices to decisions to rank them, 
decision-makers perform a more basic evaluation: satisfactory/ not satisfactory. There is 
a sequential process of search, until a satisfactory level of utility is reached. Then, the 
search is curtailed (“that will do”).  Normally the first identified satisfactory alternative is 
selected. The search takes into consideration the environment, as the satisficing person 
operates with a rationality that is practically feasible within an organisation, not one that 
aims for utility maximisation (Brown 2004).  
Etzioni (1967) proposed ‘mixed-scanning’ as an alternative to the rationalist and 
incrementalist models. For Etzioni, the rationalist model imposes too many burdens on 
decision-makers; it assumes they can know all that there is to know when making a 
decision. On the other hand, incrementalism does not take into account that decision-
makers must refer to broader guidelines when evaluating their small steps, to assess 
whether the current lines of action are adequate. The mixed-scanning model involves 
two sets of judgements: grand a-priori choices about an organization’s goals and policies 
and ‘small, experimental decisions based on in-depth examination of a focused subset of 
facts and choices’ (Etzioni 1989:124). Organisations operate through trial and error, and 
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because of this organisations must be ready to reverse their decisions. Mixed-scanning 
is thus “humble decision-making”.  
Cohen et al. (1972) and Kingdon’s (1984) ‘garbage can’ model does not start with a 
problem and end with a solution. Instead, it looks at how the interactions between three 
different but interrelated streams “problem”, “policy” (policy solutions “float” looking for 
problems) and “political” (related to events such as elections) affect the inclusion of 
particular issues into the political agenda. Problems and solutions are contingent, as they 
change when policy actors change. Policy entrepreneurs connect at least two of the 
streams to take advantage of windows of opportunities for policy decisions. The garbage 
can model warns against overemphasising the rationality and linearity of agenda setting, 
but gravitates around government officials, and gives little weight to political differences.  
Each of these decision-making models can be understood as a response to each of the 
stages of the rational model, which have left the model in a discredited position as a 
descriptor of how policy-making could be expected to operate: the garbage can model 
questions primarily the linearity of steps 1, 2 (rational problem definition and goal setting) 
and 6 (decision-evaluation); the incremental model calls into question step 3 of the 
rational model (alternative generation) to underline practical limits in the options that 
policy-makers analyse; the mixed scanning-model underlines the practical limits in step 4 
(the analysis of the consequences of each alternative) and the administrative model 
questions step 5, underlining how the selection of alternatives takes place is not as 
exhaustive as the rational model suggests.  
Different models of decision-making may be more appropriate to some circumstances 
than others (Tarter and Hoy 1998). The reminder of the paper explores, through 
documentary analysis, which model of decision-making dominates in the EU’s IA 
process, and the associated consequences. 
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4. Methodology 
The paper analyses six IAs produced by DG Education and Culture (DG EAC) of the 
European Commission, from 2002 (the year in which the EU framework for IAs was 
introduced) up to 2007, when the financial framework 2007-2013 was approved. While 
the number of IAs reviewed is limited, they cover the most important expenditure 
programmes up to 2013 in the areas of education, training, youth, culture and citizenship: 
E-Learning (2002), Lifelong Learning Programme (2004); Youth Programme (2004); 
Culture (2004); Citizens for Europe (2005); Erasmus Mundus I (2002). Each IA was 
reviewed to determine the quality and scope of the information contained (Harrington and 
Morgenstern 2004). The analysis also considered the EU IA guidelines, as they define the 
framework applicable to all EU IAs since 2002. The 2002 guidelines were used as the 
main point of reference. Mention of later guidelines is made as appropriate. The 
guidelines are fairly consistent between themselves: while recent versions refine specific 
aspects, their philosophy is similar throughout the period. 
The analysis focused on three main elements: first, IAs’ structure; second, their level of 
compliance with the IA Guidelines (using a pre-defined framework to check whether the 
IAs contained certain items). These initial two stages are linked to the ‘scorecard 
approach’ (Hahn and Dudley 2004), the most widely used approach to analyse IAs. 
Following Fritsch et al. (2012), the coding I took into account proportionality, the 
importance and nature of the IA proposal when assessing item presence/ non presence 
(i.e. a more detailed assessment of costs may be required for new programmes than on a 
managerial modification of an existing programme), to reduce biases. For similar reasons, 
instead of entering a ‘No’ value when an item was not calculated in an IA, a ‘Yes’ value 
was entered when the IA explained why a certain item was not addressed. 
While useful ‘scorecards’  tend to be used to analyse the ‘quality’ of IAs in a relatively 
superficial way, checking for compliance with IA guidelines (Fritsch et al. 2012). I argue 
that this is an important, but incomplete and restrictive, conception of quality: formal 
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quality. Although ‘the IA framework is all about procedure and avoids as far as possible 
referring to substance, all IAs deal with substance’ (Radaelli and Meuwese 2010:144). 
Thus, a third element was introduced in the analysis: the actual ways of argumentation 
(substantive quality of the arguments) employed. This was assessed through an in-depth 
examination of the content of the IAs (Krippendorff 2004). Here, the aim was not to look 
for omissions with reference to the guidelines (Yes/ No), but for errors and pitfalls, such 
as the taking of a false logical path that destroys the validity of an argument (Majone 
1980), in IAs.  
The IA documents analysed provide the ‘end-product’ and do not detail the machinations 
that led to the decisions they embody. This poses challenges for a study that aims to 
relate modes of decision-making to IA documents. However, the intention is, first, to 
ascertain the policy model presented in the IA to, second, assess its fitness with the 
content of the IA documents reviewed. The reasoning behind this is that if a mismatch 
exists this may be explained not only with reference to ‘poor implementation’ -which is the 
mainstream concern in the ‘scorecard’ IA literature- but also with reference to the model 
adopted in the guidelines. Such conjunction can be argued relatively independently of 
which particular model may better explain the actual decisions that led to the IAs were 
made -indeed, providing a final answer on this point is beyond the ambitions of this 
article. 
5. Regulatory impact assessments in EU education policy-making  
5.1 IA structure and score-card analysis 
This section reports on the findings of the analysis of the six IAs reviewed. This first part 
summarises the structure of the IAs, and presents the results of the scorecard analysis, 
whereas the following two subsections present more detailed information on the IA’s 
substantive arguments. The structure of the IAs examined was fairly consistent across 
IAs and with the IA guidelines. A template of the standard structure of the reviewed IAs is 
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provided in Table 1. This suggests both the use of the guidelines and, given the number 
of repeated sub-sections across IAs and the consistent nature of the content in some of 
the sections, also a high degree of coordination between IAs teams at DG EAC -in 
particular in relation to the LLP, Culture and Youth in Action IAs, released on the same 
day. 
[Table 1 Around here] 
The EU presents IAs as part of a rational decision-making process in both the guidelines 
and, logically, also in the structure of the IA that implement them, which is at odds with the 
way in which policy-making operates (European Commission 2002d:2; 2002e:19-20; 2009) 
but consistent with its positivist approach to evaluation, identified by previous studies 
(Hoerner and Stephenson 2012). 
The ordering of the sections was sometimes slightly different across IAs. The e-Learning 
report considered alternative delivery mechanisms/ policy options and risk assessment 
under a single section, where it also included an assessment of the different options; and the 
Erasmus Mundus IA included the risk assessment under the analysis of the policy options. 
But structural variations were limited. Even the length of the IAs was rather consistent, at 
around 35-40 pages plus annexes (except for e-learning and Erasmus Mundus, which were 
shorter), even though the financial commitment requested by the assessments varied very 
significantly (from a few hundred million to several billion in the case of the LLP). 
Table 2 provides more detailed results on the scorecard analysis performed on a set of 
items selected because of their importance in the IA guidelines and in previous literature. 
The analysis suggests some improvement of ‘formal quality’ over time, mainly as a result of 
the poor performance of the 2002 e-Learning report.  
[Table 2 around here] 
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Formal quality varied by individual item. Performance was better in relation to the items on 
‘definition of policy objectives’ and ‘assessment of impacts’ than in ‘problem definition’, 
‘identification’ and ‘selection’ of options. However, on the whole, the results are rather 
promising: most IA obtain a positive score for item presence on around two thirds of 
individual sub-items. 
To address concerns with the formal nature of the above analysis (cf. section 4), the next 
two subsections cover in more detail the substantive quality of the arguments employed in 
the problem definition and establishment of policy objectives (the ‘what is to be done?’ part 
of IAs) and identification of options, assessment of impacts and examination of options (the 
‘how is to be done?’ part of IAs) respectively. The aim of the following discussion is not to 
report exhaustively on the arguments of each IA, but to offer an illustration and assessment 
of the ways in which IAs have presented their arguments, and their pitfalls, in an 
argumentative analysis that can be contrasted to the results of the scorecard analysis 
presented. This reveals significantly higher shortcomings in the substantive quality of IAs 
than in their formal quality.  
5.2 Solving problems or creating them? 
The first two stages in the rational model are the rational definition of a problem, selected 
between a range of alternatives and the establishment of goals in relation to that problem 
(what to do?). The ‘problem analysis’ sections in the IAs should refer to problems and 
associated policy objectives as something ‘unbiased’: problems “should not be identified as 
a ‘lack of something’ or as a ‘need for something’ as this can bias the definition of objectives 
and the choice of policy instruments” (European Commission 2009:21). Policy problems 
have identifiable causes, which can be represented in problem trees. The guidelines also 
expect that IAs’ describe the nature and scale of policy problems to be addressed, identify 
their drivers, the sectors and social groups primarily affected by the suggested interventions 
and justify interventions on the bases of market failures, equity concerns or dissonance 
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between the existing situation and EU objectives, all of which conforms to rational 
conceptions of policy-making.  
The problem definition sections of the IA reviewed show mixed results by item, with IAs 
reflecting on the causes of the problem and groups affected but failing to quantify those and 
often not justifying public interventions. The approach adopted in the IAs was not to quantify 
the scale of pontential problems to choose ‘the’ most pressing within the range of 
competences of the decision-maker, as the rational model would suggest, but to show that 
the problem addressed was important (a satisficing strategy). Moreover, the IAs show no 
reflection on ‘problematisations’, on how problems could be defined differently to the way in 
which they are presented, on how they are created, defined and redefined in policy 
proposals. In other words, there is little recognition that choice is exercised not only in the 
formulation of ‘solutions’ but also at the time of formulation of policy ‘problems’ and agenda 
setting –an aspect in relation to which garbage can models could offer valuable insights.  
The problem definition section in the IAs reviewed ranged from two to five pages, a striking 
uniformity given the different nature of the IAs. This uniformity reinforced the message that 
there is a ‘right’ way to produce policy through a set of predefined procedures to be 
universally applied, even though the types of problems identified in the IAs were certainly 
heterogeneous. While there is no coherent set of problems across IAs, these were often 
related to very general aspects of international economic competitiveness and labour market 
inclusion (European Commission 2004a), following the Lisbon Agenda. A second set of 
problems was simply self-referential, such as the problem of “losing momentum” if a EU 
programme is not adopted following an Action Plan or EU political declaration (European 
Commission 2002b; 2002c; 2004b; 2004c, 2005b), the problem of not “fully exploiting” the 
benefits of the approaches tested by previous EU programmes (European Commission 
2004b:8) or the criticisms that the Commission would receive if a programme is not adopted: 
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“Many citizens only experience the Union as a distant and remote political and economic 
entity as reflected in the low turnouts for European elections. Recent opinion polls also show 
falling levels of support for European Union membership.(…) A promise has been given to 
citizens […] that cannot go unanswered The Commission would be severely criticised in 
such circumstances” (European Commission 2005b:6). 
This underlines the weight that institutional considerations carried for the Commission.  
At worst, problem rationalisation and quantification were inaccurate. The e-Learning IA 
argued that most European Higher Education faced ‘a crisis’ where “the number of students 
is falling significantly as a result of demographic changes” (European Commission 2002b:3), 
without providing any figures and ignoring that the number of higher education students 
increased steadily in Europe before the IA: from 12.5 million in 1999 to 12.8 million in 2001 
and 13.2 million in 2002 in the EU-15 (Eurostat Database 2001). The most striking 
admission in this respect is perhaps given in the lifelong learning programme IA, which 
states that it “assumes” (sic) that:  
“…the needs listed under section 2 of this document are real and common throughout 
Europe. Sufficient evidence is provided by the various political statements and decisions 
made by Member States” (European Commission 2004a:21). 
This is not particularly good practice. However, in reality, the most pressing problems cannot 
be identified because the data required for a ‘synoptic’ review of problems is not/ cannot be 
made available and because the importance of a problem is a value judgement -and no 
clear criteria for value judgements are provided in the IA guidelines. References to the 
needs of specific groups are made in the IAs, but in a restrictive and tokenistic way that had 
no bearing on the analysis. 
Problem definition is followed by the identification of policy objectives, which showed highly 
positive results in Table 2. This formal assessment contrasts with the quality of the 
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substance of the IAs, as we shall see. In the Guidelines, measurement accompanies 
objectivity in the definition of objectives: from a proper identification and quantification of 
problems, coherent and ‘SMART’ (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-
dependent) global, specific and operational policy objectives should be derived, as the only 
way to provide “effective criteria for assessing the success or failure of the proposed policy 
options” (European Commission 2009:26). This is aligned to Fritsch et al. (2012) who see 
the establishment of ‘operational objectives’ as key element and a vital precondition for the 
effective monitoring of policy effectiveness.  
All the reviewed IA presented a set of operational objectives. However, closer inspection 
reveals that their quality is insufficient for guiding policy evaluation, as also recognised in the 
evaluations of the programmes that followed the IAs. The LLP interim evaluation, for 
instance, reports that the number of operational objectives of the LLP is too large, that the 
majority of them overlap and that their logical links with higher level objectives are ‘not 
straightforward’ (PPMI 2011:45). It should be noted that making this kind of judgements 
requires in-depth knowledge of the programme and policy arena. This, again, raises 
questions regarding the validity of results of scorecard analyses that examine IAs across 
large numbers of policy areas to increase sample sizes and ‘enhance’ the statistical 
representativity of results –cf. also section 4 above. 
A note should be added regarding the extent to which IAs increased democratic governance 
and active citizenship in the period covered. The limitations in this respect are exposed by 
the guidelines themselves. They requested that DGs (2002e): 
“Consult interested parties and relevant experts. In order to be credible, impact assessment 
cannot be carried out behind "closed doors". Where appropriate, consult with interested 
parties and relevant experts.” (European Commission 2002e:10, emphasis added) 
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Consultations are thus not presented simply as tools to increase the democratic potential or 
technical effectiveness of a policy, but also its credibility. In the IAs reviewed, consultation 
results –from large surveys and well as more individualised contacts with stakeholders- were 
only used to support the decisions made. Given how unrealistic this is, the implication is that 
consensus is fabricated rather than constructed through the process. 
5.3 Policy options 
Stages three, four and five of the rational model refer to the generation of an exhaustive list 
of alternatives (European Commission 2005a:23), the analysis of all their consequences and 
the selection of the best alternative (how to do it?’). The incremental, mixed scanning and 
administrative models question each of these stages respectively. The scorecard presented 
in Table 2 reported mixed results regarding the definition of a list of alternative options (if 
one is relaxed regarding the rational requirement for the list to be ‘exhaustive’) and the 
selection of options (if one relaxes the rational requirement for ‘all the consequences to be 
examined for all options’), but good results in relation to the provision of some assessment 
of economic, social and environmental impacts.  
The IA guidelines require officials to ‘think out of the box’ ‘identifying and screenng a wide 
palette of options’ to increase quality and transparency (European Commission 
2002e:10;2005a:23) before narrowing options to 3-4 for more in-depth analysis. IAs do not 
offer the ‘long list’ of options –if they exist- but normally four/ five options. Options were 
similar across IAs: (1) no programme; (2) continuation of the current programme (when 
applicable); (3) slight modification of the current programme; (4) integration with other 
programmes in the area; (5) (more or less) ‘new’ programme.  
The IA guidelines clarify that the screening of options should be done on the basis of the 
impact of the different options. In line with the synoptic model, the selection of “the best” 
option will come from the analysis of alternatives and the study of all their impacts 
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(European Commission 2005a:26), since “The Impact Assessment must clearly and 
systematically present all the positive and negative impacts” (European Commission 
2002e:10) of the different options. However, in the IAs reviewed the range of social, 
economic and environmental impacts are only assessed for the preferred option, and 
negative impacts are only specified for options other than the selected options –those are in 
all cases presented as win-wins. The Lifelong Learning Programme IA states nothing less 
than “from an economic point of view, the integrated programme is likely to affect positively 
all those involved in the productive process”, i.e., employers, individuals and the education 
sector as a whole (European Commission 2004a:10).  
The guidelines suggest that causes and effects can be clearly identified and isolated 
(European Commission 2005a:17). Thus, according to the rational model, the IA should 
consider direct and indirect impacts, intended and unintended impacts, short-medium and 
long term time spans and should be expressed in economic, social and environmental 
terms, systematically identifying who (regions, gender, ethnic group) is affected and over 
what timescale the impacts will occur (European Commission 2005).  
IA scorecard analyses have tended to report on the mention of economic, social and 
environmetal impacts. This is also the case in Table 2, but the results hide the fact that the 
analysis is rudimentary and in relation to the preferred option only. Moreover, there is no 
acknowledgement of any potential trade-offs between objectives of economic growth, social 
equality and environmental sustainability.  
The poor results regarding the quantification and monetization of the benefits of the options 
for the selection between alternatives could be expected. Such instruments, while favoured 
in the guidelines, do not suit the education policy field very well. Education programmes 
were often geared to experimentation, the implementation of pilot projects and the setting up 
of networks. The value of such activities is difficult to monetize, even under the most heroic 
assumptions. How should the performance of different options regarding ‘the strengthening 
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of civil society’ sought by the Citizens for Europe programme be exactly quantified? Clearly 
there are important, if not insurmountable, issues here.  
However, some options were disregarded surprisingly hastily simply because they would 
cause a lack of credibility to the EU or were not consistent with declarations of a 
Commissioner (European Commission 2005b:6-7; European Commission 2004b:8-9). The 
treatment of non-selected options is superficial. The e-Learning IA, for example, deals with 
the four options it considers in approximately five lines, before selecting a preferred option 
(cf. also European Commission 2005b).  It would seem that the IA process often compares 
‘a live horse with a number of dead horses’ in relation to the selection of policy options (cf. 
Baldwin 2007). This not only the practice in education IAs it is something more widespread; 
the European Court of Auditors (2010) suggests that the Commission does not use IAs to 
decide whether or not to go ahead with a proposal: the decision to try to launch, discontinue 
or modify an initiative can be taken before the IA is finalized, or even started. The current 
status quo or power foces/ political circumstances, organisational strategic aims, trial and 
error processes of institutional learning, or satisficing selection strategies not referred to in 
the guidelines –rather than a painstaking assessment of all impacts- have significant weight 
in the selection of alternatives. In effect, the options eventually favoured by the IAs were 
largely incremental, except for the creation of new programmes. Thus, most changes 
referred to specific programme settings - in search of higher efficiency levels -, not to their 
policy instruments or goals (Hall 1993). Rather than a rational policy model that explains 
policy based on existing needs as the Guidelines defend, one of the main factors explaining 
policy at time 1 is policy at time 0.  
In spite of the above shortcomings, the conclusions of the assessments are categorical: 
“without a programme, (…) from an economic viewpoint individual Member States would be 
in a less favourable position (…) From a social viewpoint, a number of problems would 
remain largely untackled (…) Moreover, disadvantaged categories of citizens that are 
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targeted by the programme might not be equally taken care of in all countries” (European 
Commission 2004a:11). 
6. Discussion and conclusions: evidently legitimising policy? 
This article has explored the insides of the “better regulation” movement, with a focus on the 
use of regulatory IAs in education, culture, youth and citizenship and a particular concern 
with the use of evidence and the potential to bring about democratic governance of IAs. IAs, 
the paper has argued, are a valuable sources of information on the ways in which the 
Commission portrays externally EU intervention. It is recognised that the EU IA system is 
more developed than equivalent systems in most EU countries. Yet, the IAs reviewed fall 
short of what is expected from them in increasing citizens’ input into policy-making due to 
the partisan use of consultation results. It is thus unsurprising that stakeholders see policy IA 
reports as a justification of the Commission’s proposals, rather than an independent 
assessment of its possible impacts (ECA 2010). IAs also fall short on what the guidelines 
expect from them, which closely follows the rational model of policy-making. Smith and May 
(1980) argued that the rational model aims to outline how policy-making should be, while the 
incremental and mix-scanning models are descriptive. A problem is that the Commission 
presents its guidelines as a prescription and description. The IA Guidelines and IA reports 
take elements of other decision-making models (incrementalism, mixed scanning), which 
seem more appropriate to describe and inform how policy-making operates, only marginally. 
Much of what failed, it could be argued, was the application of the model, rather than the 
model itself. Results may be different in other policy areas, which is a task for future 
research. The larger question, however, is whether the application of the model is feasible 
and whether striving towards it is the most helpful exercise –or even a satisficing one. To be 
sure, part of the distance between reality and guidelines has to do with lack of knowledge 
and time (Torriti 2010). IAs may provide a ‘learning instrument’. The results reported are 
based on an analysis of the first set of IAs produced by the Commission in education and 
culture, when the system was in its very early stages. Institutional learning processes can 
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take decades. Fritsch et al. (2012:11), suggest that learning in relation to IA has taken place 
in the EU in the much shorter period 2005-2010, and improved the capacity of the 
Commission to assess likely programme impacts (Radaelli and Meuwese 2010).  
Yet, even future IAs will be unable to make up for the fact that they are based on a model of 
policy-making that we know is not realistic. Furthermore, Majone’s (1989) point –often 
overlooked in the IA literature- that in order to be persuasive evidence needs to be chosen 
with a particular audience in mind is relevant here. For individual DGs the main audience is 
busy policy-makers who need to support their proposals -and now top officials in the IA 
Board. Arguments in IAs need to be as simple, familiar or at least intituitive as possible in 
order to appeal at first glance and to non-experts. This is at odds with comprehensiveness 
and overwhelming synoptic analysis. The idea of “better regulation” refers to something that 
is not just better but ‘too good’ to be implemented. Rather than having a model that is 
adapted to how the policy-cycle works and facilitates its quality, DGs may have to spend 
their time and energy trying to rationalise decisions ‘ex-post’, providing limited added value. 
The real challenge is not to improve the compliance of IAs with the guidelines, but to design 
IA guidelines that better reflect the ways in which policy-making works.  
This is difficult because IAs are not only meant to provide technical gains. They also provide 
greater transparency and legitimacy to the policy process. Rationality is linked to intelligent 
choices, and few values are closer to the core of Western political ideologies. IAs should 
show stakeholders that other options they may prefer have been analysed seriously and 
explain why they have not been selected (European Commission 2009:28). A priori, there is 
no trade-off between effectiveness and legitimacy functions, as adopting effective policies 
can increase legitimacy. Yet, Hertin et al. (2007) suggest, and this article reinforces this 
view, that IAs inform policy design at the margins. IAs were established for different 
purposes: Member States and the Parliament wished to control the Commission, yet the 
Commission, has been able to turn the system to its advantage and has increased its 
capacity for policy formulation (Radaelli and Meuwese 2010). But the Commission is itself a 
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complex policy actor and this complexity is reflected in the political economy of IA 
production. Thus, the Secretariat General benefits from the symbolic value of the IA system 
and the procedural legitimisation of the outcomes. However, for individual DGs (IA 
producers), the usage of individual IAs may not be primarily instrumental, symbolic or 
conceptual, but ‘imposed’, whereby a superordinate body demands specific action on lower 
operating levels, based on evidence, to release funds (Weiss et al. 2005). This may help to 
explain some of the deficiencies in the IAs reviewed. Given the nature of these deficiencies, 
they are highly unlikely to reflect only lack of knowledge. The reported low substantive 
quality is suggestive of the low instrumental value of IAs.  
A final conclusion, methodological, refers to the need to complement ‘formal’ assessments 
of IA quality with ‘substantive’ assessments. The analysis suggests that there are 
significantly higher shortcomings in the substantive quality of IAs than in their formal quality. 
Moreover, it is the examination of those substantive shortcomings that is more likely to 
produce results in terms of better governance. As IAs become more important, one might 
ask how often the quality of their substantive arguments will justify their use. 
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